



Monitoring plane architecture for modern cloud-based networks

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
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
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
Network architecture and scenario




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
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
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


Network architecture and scenario



Some numbers on data centers

packet traffic distribution among applications (2010)



packet traffic distribution among applications (2020)




FIG. by STRONGEST D2.1

Specifics of the services, which can be classified as:

- **Interactive:** delay in RTT below 150ms and jitter below 10ms
- **Guaranteed:** delay below 400 ms, no specific requirements on jitter (buffering is enough)
- **Best effort**



Considerations on QoS and QoT

- QoS affected by QoT: e.g., packet loss rate (PLR) — thus delay and jitter because of packet retransmission — influenced by bit error rate (BER)



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
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ABNO architecture includes functional modules **controlling and managing networks and services**



Application-based Network Operations (ABNO)

IETF RFC 7491



- OAM receiving **alerts** about potential problems
- **correlating** them
- **triggering other components** of the ABNO system to take action to preserve or recover the services

Figure 1 : Generic ABNO Architecture



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- Alarms are typically managed considering hard failures; soft failures are not considered
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
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Monitors





- Lightpath (LP) monitors are assumed integrated in the DSP of each lightpath coherent receiver (e.g., pre-FEC BER monitoring)
- Power monitors can be assumed for links and nodes
- Service monitors for PLR, delay, jitter





Hierarchical monitoring architecture

- Each entity is responsible for specific elements: e.g. a set of lightpaths





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 - correlation
 - actions
 - notifications to the upper layers





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


- EX: **LP level 0**: 1 per active lightpath




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
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- EX: **LP group level 1**: each box group all the lightpaths starting from the same ingress node
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
Simulation scenario



- Comparison of two management architectures:
 - i) the proposed **hierarchical** monitoring architecture;
 - ii) a **centralized OAM** receiving all monitoring information and correlating them.
- **Soft-failure**: performance of a network element – such as an amplifier – are degraded causing the OSNR decrease of traversing lightpaths → some lightpaths suffer, others not: e.g. OSNR degradation may imply a BER increase over the threshold (thus, generating alarms) or not (not generating alarms)



Soft failure



Conclusions

- Improve correlation for monitored parameters coming from different layers
- Management of soft failures: identification of the fault and localization
- Scalable management plane

- This work enhanced the hierarchical monitoring architecture proposed within the EU ORCHESTRA project
- ABNO OAM Handler functionalities are spread into several hierarchical layers, enabling to confine sets of monitored physical parameters within specific levels in the hierarchy:
 - Scalable solution
- Correlation of different-layer monitored parameters is enabled





ACK: The work has been supported by the ORCHESTRA project.




email: nicola.sambo@sssup.it




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
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
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

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

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

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


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


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- Then, LP level 2 can group all the lightpaths whose ingress node belongs to a specific region of the network and so on up to a generic level H.





Monitoring entity



- **Agent** disseminates monitoring information to the upper layer
- Although not shown, the Manager at level i is connected to several monitoring entities of the level $i-1$
- **Manager** correlates and processes info coming from agents at the level $i-1$

